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Abstract

In this paper, I undertake a comparative analysis of the authoritarian
process in Venezuela and Turkey. In both countries, there are signs of political and
economic instabilities. Therefore, I examine Turkey's and Venezuela's politics and
economy to understand the reasons for authoritarian regimes. The comparison
reveals that both countries are en route of authoritarianism; however, the motives
are d ifferent. As for Venezuela. comparison grounds the argument that their
authoritativeness relies on ecor.omic instability. On the contrary, Turkey has a
stable economy while it has been struggling with political upheavals.
The result of this study pinpoints different ways for authoritarian regimes.
Even though authoritarian motives originated from different reasons, both
countries approach an authoritarian regime. As a result, research suggests that
.

.

Venezuela and Turkey are disadvantaged countries as democracies.

• , \
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
One of the most difficult challenges is to describe and measure democracy
because it has been defined in many different ways (Collier and Levitsky 1 997;
Coppedge 2012). Coppedge (2012) claims that definition of democracy fits into
one of six overlapping models: liberal, deliberative, representative, participatory,
socioeconomic and people's democracy. Therefore, agreeing on a definition of
democracy is difficult. What we know is that the dictionary definition of democracy
is "a system of a government, in which the supreme power is vested in the people
and exercised by every citizen directly

Oi

indirectly through a system of

representation usually involving periodically held free election to vote and elect its
governmental officials."(Merriam-Webster 201 8). However, as Coppedge claimed
.
.
that the elections are not the only component to being a democratic country; more
is needed for a country to be called a· democracy (Coppedge et al. 201 1 ) . Although
various credible international institutions define democracy differently, it is
generally measured by five categories: electoral process, executive-legislative
relations (functioning of government), political culture (corruption, lack of press
freedom), judiciary and public-government relations (Eckhardt 1 991 ).
In comparison to democracy, authoritarianism is a form of government
characterized by a strong central power and limited representation for citizens. A
pioneer in the study of authoritarian systems of government, Luan J.Linz,
examined authoritarian regimes using four characteristics: political pluralism,
legitimacy, social mobilization and shifted executive power (Francisco 200·1).
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Since democracy and authoritarianism are direct opposite forms of each
other, authoritarian regimes and the democratization process have attracted
political science scholars for decades. After the democratization process began in
the wwld, scholar� shifted their studies to how authoritarian governments develop
irito democratic ones. However, numerous democra.tic countries have begun to
turn toward authoritarianism. In recent days, some scholars, like Diamond and
Plattner. believe that "Authoritarianism Goes Global" (Diamond, Plattner, and
Walker 2016). Therefore, it can be said that the struggle for democracy is
intensifying in many places around the world.
In that case, it can be inquired: While democracy is a popular form of
government in the contemporary world and it gives freedom to choose to the
people, why are there still some authoritarian or semi-democratic (hybrid regimes)
countries in the wo"rld (Ekman 2009)? Economics, politics," and religion could
account for the transition from democracy to authoritarianism. So, what are the
dynamics beyond this tendency of authoritativeness then?
Birth Of Democracy
The debate between authoritarianism and democracy originated from the
debate between idealists, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and realists, like Thomas
Hobbes. Rousseau argued that our natural condition is one of peace and harmony
and that democracy is the way we make our social life reflect our egalitarian nature
(Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1 762). Thomas Hobbes claimed in his book,

Leviathan
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that "the war of all against all" (HQbbes 1 65 1 , chap. XIII) 1 is the human condition.
individuals are born as enemies and pursue only their own interest with eagerness
(Hobbes 1 651 ) . Both philosophers would be right because like a child, each person
cries for both freedom and security. The need for security makes humankind
miserable and enemies. The need for security necessitates the creation of an
institution-government that takes care of the needs of people. However, Thomas
Jefferson clearly stated in the American declaration of independence that human
beings are free and equal by nature, and government as an institution serves only
to guarantee those natural rights (The Declaration of Independence 2001). This
debate also demonstrates that the struggle within humanity turns out to be the
struggle for democracy.
De mocracy is not well-ordered. It is rough, blusterous, a messy form of
political ' life but it is its nature. Montesquieu even claimed that when one finds an
orderly and quiet place, one will find the tyranny. "Whenever voices are raised in
a debate, where there are uproar and unceasing talk, where" men and women
bewilder t.heir way to solve for permanent problems for themselves, we can feel
.
assured that we are on the way of precious democracy" (Secondat Charles de
.

1 748, Quated in Struggle for Democracy, 1988 ) Democracy is final:y- more than
.

any other form of government- about people, just plain people.

:

1

.

In Latin, "The war of all against all is Bellum omnium contra omnes. This phrase was
"

written in De Give (1642) and Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes to describe hllman
existence in the state of nature.
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The birth of democracy. occurred centuries ago. Historians believe that
evolution through tyranny to democracy dates back to the sixth century B.C.
(Robert K. Fleck and Hanssen 2010). In these somber times, when the governance
was in privileged aristocrats' power, many things started changing with the election
of a statesman, Solon, who had an jdealist vision (The Editors of Encylopedia
Britannica 1 998). By his idealist vision, he introduced many reforms that initiated
the transforri}ation of Ath.ens and the world (Fornara and Samons I I 1991). The
most important factor was that his reform provided the dispersal of the tribes and
clans which had always driven the Athenians into conflict. Granting citizens the
option to manage their own debts was the first freedom for citizens. (The Editors
of Encylopadia Britannica 1998). Although those reforms did not bring complete
democracy, the ground was prepared for it (Fornara and Samons II 1 9 9 1 , 38). After
Solon and his successor Pisistratus's reforms, Greece was still under the
d omination of Persians in 508 B.C. In that time, Athens' last law-giver, Cleisthenes,
appeared (Robinson 1945). While Solon and Pisistratus diminished the power of
clans, it can be claimed that Cleisthenes changed the way of using power. He
separated the clans and tribes, creating specific places for each of them. He
created artificial tribes and each tribe was divided into demes. Those demes were
spread throughout Athens (Bradeen 1955). Each man born in that deme was a
citizen of that deme. Other tha· n deme, there was an assembly which governed the
demes. The impressive part of this period of C!eisthenes is that he obligated all
citizens to participate in the Assembly. No law could pass without the Assembly's
approval (Barber and Watson 1988). Hence it can be said that the rule by
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hereditary king and the gifted tyrants was over. Democracy-kratos, or rule, of the
demos, the people of the deme- was finally born.
As it is seen above, even the birth of democracy originated from keeping
freedom in the hands of the citizenry. Therefore, freedom can be linked with
democracy. Rousseau once wrote ''Freedom is a food easy to eat but hard to
digest" (quated in Baber and Dimon 201 3, 218). \/Vhether democracy comes
suddenly by violence and revolution or slowly through an accretion of an institution
that extends and protects liberty, achieving freedom, in other words consolidating
democracy in the first instance may not be so difficult. Preserving, enhancing and
securing it against its myriad and tireless adversaries are much harder (Jean
Jacques Rousseau 1762).
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Contemporary Democracy
Democracy must be more than a desire or disposition to be able to apply it.
It depends in practice on a constitution and the institutional arrangements. It can
vary a great deal from nation to nation and era to era. Democracy is not simply an
ideal to be realized once and for all, or

a

project reproduced again and again

around the world because governments are as mortal as people. After all,
thousands of years since the Athenians disappeared from history, government had
been experienced many forms of regimes. Yet, the Athenians handed down some
fundamental factors for modern democracy:
-Assembly

democracy:

citizens

participated

in

assembly

without

representatives
-Citizen Juries: justice became a responsibility of citizens by elections
.
-The appointment of cit izens to politically based on a merit. (Blackwell 2003)
These institutions take a place as crucial democratic devices in modern
days like: representation, party governrr1ent and federalism (Kaiser 1 997).
However, these devices cannot oper�te in a void. The

y need

an environment

which allows people to feel safe and free.
Modern democracy represents freedom and equality. Credible institutions,
'
"
like the Freedo m House, measure a co unf ries' democracy based on their criteria.
It is critical to keep in mind that democracy is not a destination·- it is a journey; a
way in which people walk together; meanwhile they may traverse many different
terrains. The journey of democracy has a natural progression. The progression
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..·
·.

toward democracy typically follows a roadmap: First, the centralized power would
be taken by elit�s. Then the desire for democracy, equality, and liberty takes power
from those elites and places it in t�e hands of the citiz�ns. Finally, the use of law
to protect individuals from the abuse of that power-whether
it is in the hand of �lites
.
or of the people at large. (Barber and Watson 1�88).
Although .law and demo.cracy have not always existed in harmony, they
.
.

were initially . integrated jnto each other in the systems. �ometimes, however, the
.
.

.

application of the law coincides with justice. In the creation of modern democracy,
which means the victory of parliament over the king, the law served democracy by
placing the function of legislation in the hands of the people's representatives
(Waldron 2008). Besides, law maintained its essence, which is the law of nature
which protected the rights of individuals to liberty and equality against every
encroachment- whether from other individuals or from the state, even the
democratic state (<;e9en 1 989). So, the tension between law as a protector of
.
individu als against the state and law as an instrument through which the state
establishes community justice remains. Yet, as Rousseau mentioned that while we
obey the iaw, we could be free only if we prescribe order for ourselves (Dent 2006).
In the light of these thoughts, Americans attempted to create a balance
between freedom and security to maintain both liberty and self-government and to
govern themselves autonomously and lawfully.·
established

�

Therefore, in the end they

fede�al c� nstitutiori which assigned powers to a powerful central

'
government but at the same time they ai med to protect themselves from abuse by
every tyranny, including the potential tyranny of democratic government. As
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consequences of this aim, they .haq set lavi1fui restraints on government- dividing
•'

its power into three co-equal branches (executive, legislative and judicial) and
establishing a legal wall around it, which they called the Bill of Rights (Lloyd 2013).
This division can be accepted as a good definition of democracy. On the other
hand, democracy does not mean that people can do whatever they want. While
the power is given to the representatives, it is also protected by the judiciary for
equality and freedom. Yet, the system was· not enough to persuade citizens to feel
free. They also insist on selecting their states judges in a democratic way. It was
the introduction of judicial review, which led the demand for term limits. Like
Thomas Jefferson, many founders believed that this would bring the balance of
power in favor of a judicial elitf:: (Frank 2012) ..
If must be understood that being subjected to the law does not make
democracy safeguarded because if the law in

a

democracy is just a codification of

the will of the majority, then there is nothing that the law can do for freedom and
.
equality. Nazi legislation is proof that applying the rule of law is not a democracy
(Esgun 2018). Anything can be made legal by the legislative enactments of an
elected parliament: the abrogation of freedom of opinion and expression, violation
of the right to work, discrimination, expropriation, and even genocide. Nazi
legislation was an unprecedented example of demolished liberties and social
justices. John Dryden stated that, "Laws are vain, by which we right enjoy, if kings
unquestioned can those laws destroy" (Dryden 2017, I. 763). The key words here
.

.

.

are right and efficiency, the contest is between a law that secures the rights of the
individual and a law that enforces the community's common interest in legislating
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on behalf of the public good, even at the cost of individual liberty. Thus, democracy
can succeed, if law is subjected to democracy.
Modern-day democracy pays attention to not only having a rule of law but
.
also how close citizens are to making law through participation in legislation and
.

elections for both representatives and another official administrates. Besides, the
other subject of modern-day democracy concerns about maintaining universal
human rights (Moravcsik 1 998).
Even though countries claim that they are governed by democracies,
claiming does not make countries truly democratic. Yet, on the one hand countries
are sovereign, on the other hand declaration of human rights remind us how
governments should protect their citizens' rights. Therefore, human rights are not
only an aspiration to universal justice but also a guiding spirit for democratic
countries. Providing human rights to the citizenry is essential because they are
rights inherent to all human beings regardless of nationality, ethnicity, language,
race, sex, or any other statues (Human Rights 2016). Even if a country does not
describe itself as a democratic one, it is expected to ensure human rights. Having
and maintaining human rights is not easily controllable.
Even though democracy means citizens governing themselves, democratic
regulations can be easily abolished. Therefore, citizens should stake a claim on :t
and express their judgement in the public. The classical tendency about the
meaning of democracy claims that the measurement of how many people vote,
and how often they go to the ballot box is enough to acknowledge a country as a
democratic one (Kennedy, Nagao. and Liu 2018; Kesselman 201 1 ) . However, it
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should not be forgotten that the voters merely vote and go home and leave the
elected governors to govern. Yet, the active citizen, on the other hand, actually
governs or participates in governing using institutions (Dahl 2005). In recent times,
it is cleared that without p�riicipation, democracy may become corrupt and
deteriorate into a fictious democracy then .to authoritarianism (Huntington 2012).
The key definition of modern-day democra9y is whether
.
.
.

.

.

sense of themselves as citizens- as

a

a

person has a vibrant
.

part of body politic rather than just as self-

interested individuals. If they are capable of expressing public judgment rather than
just voicing their private needs and wants freely, it can be expressed that
democracy makes itself presence felt (Axtmann 1 996). Therefore, pressure
groups, local party organizations. and voluntary associations of the kind of
participations aie essentials of the democracy to be an active citizen.
As a result, the concept of modern-day democracy is inclusive of selfgoverning, an active citizenry, and human rights and more. The prospective criteria
for countries will be discussed in the next chapter.
Prospective Criteria for Democratic Countries
There is not a measurement that can help scholars assess the rate of
democracy; however, it is clear that while some countries are democratic, others
are not. The hardest part of the measurement of democracy is to determine a finer
distinction. Besides, it is also difficult to distinguish whether countries within their
new policies are prone to democratic or authoritarian governance. Therefore,
.
.
under the leadership of Michael Coppedge, social scientists around the world, and
credible institutions like Freedom House, Kellog Institute and the Economist
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Intelligence have been working on the idea that there should be criteria to measure
democracy (Democracy

I Kellogg Institute For International Studies

2018;

Democracy Index 2017; Freedom in the World 2018). Though there is still
ambiguity surrounding the definition of democracy and the concept; thereby, same
ambiguity for criteria too. So, institutions, which have been working on the progress
of democracy over years have specifi� focus points to indicate democratic
countries.
Besides the vagueness of the definition of democracy,

Human

Developmer.t Report states that "The democracy a nation chooses to develop,
depends on its history and circumstances" (Human Development Report 2002, 4).
Thus, ·in this sense, democracy has a variety of different appearances. Besides, it

is necessary to have common things that scholars can account for a country as a
democratic one. In this concept it has to be specified at what the core traits of
democracy are, ·a nd how they sho� ld appear.
As stated above the credible i'nstitutions can come together at many points;
however, multifariousness ca n be id e ntified in their measurement criteria. Even
though their discrepancy, it can be claimed that almost all of them are using the
below main criteria:
.
nature of eleCtoral proces��s (e.g. free elections), functioning of government (e.g.

.

.

-

checks and balances on government authority), political participation (e.g. voter
turnout), democratic political culture (e.g. popular support for democracy) and civil
liberties (e.g. a free press, independent judiciary) in a country (Democracy Index
2017).
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Past Present. and Future of Authoritarianism
For most people democracy means government for by and of the people
government by free and equal individuals. Yet, the liberty of individuals can fall
prey to the equal_ity of individuals- mere voters vote anq go home and leave the
�lected governors to govern. So, the rule of the major!ty �an become so cruel, so
wro�g , so oppressive to. individuals and to minorities, that it perverts demc:icracy
_
itself, and t�e rule of the people �ecomes the tyranny of the mob.
While the last several decades led to a mushrooming of studies focusing on
democratic regimes, prominent studies examine authoritarian regimes. According
to Geddes, Wright and Frantz, dictatorships govern more than 40% of the countries
in the modern world (2014). In addition, Freedom House's 201 8 report
demonstrates· that democracy has suffered 1 2 sequential years of decline
(Freedom in the World 2018). Moreover, scholars claim that since the collapse of
communism, the world has been shattered by three trends; "a democratic surge,
a backlash and an authoritarian surge" (L. Diamond, Piattner, ·and Walker 2016).
.
Hence, it is obvious that instead of dying out, authoritarianism is on the rise.
Before .analyzing the process of the authoritarianism, it is crucial to
understand the meaning of the term. In the literature, 'authoritarian' has two
different meanings. VVhile in comparative politics, it refers to a regime, which does
not ·Offer free and fair .elections; in political psychology, authoritarianism . is related
to the.psychological profile of people, which is "characterized by a desire for order
and hierarchy and a fear of outsiders" (Feldman and Stenner 1 �97). According to
Feldman and Stenner (1 997) governments' authoritarian personalities can be

18

. . :· .
discussed based on countries' values and voting behavior. Besides, almost all
authoritarian regimes hold elections, however those elections lack oversight and
transparency. So, elections are no longer fundamental parts of democracies.
When author itarian governments hold an election, they are used as a tool by the
government to prolo ng their rule: Moreover, leaders of those governments often
promote elections as democratic values to conceal their realities (Kennedy, Nagao,
and Liu 2018). ·

It is well known that different meanings come from different exhibition of
authoritarianism because not only the definition of authoritarianism has chClnged
in centuries but it also has been taken on different focal points than previous ones.
In the. !ast century researchers not only focus on an authoritarian surge .but also
new forms of authoritarianism because prospective �andidates of autocrats take
advantage of their predecessors' and peers' experiences. Learning from their
mistakes, they have been trying to increase the durability of their power

qt

the

regime. at home and from abroad. This has be� n <?alled "political technology"
_
.(VVilson 2095) and the "authoritarian toolkit" (l. Diamond, Plattner, and Walker
2016) or a "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002). While earlier authoritarianism
studies mostly focused on how brutal authoritarian and totalitarian governments
are, current studies lean towards their appearances. Therefore, studies display
that the modern authoritarianism emerges like

a

democracy and is called a hybrid

regime (Ezrow 201 8).
Hybrid regimes sometimes are called "Competitive Authoritari'an Regimes"

(l.

Diamond, Plattner, arid Walker 2016) because while there is still competition
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for elections between parties, the president has the power to erode the checks and
balances system.

Hence, the new type of studies on democracy and

authoritarianism are more concerned with who holds power and how the power
may impact the development and stability of the governments (Geddes 1999).
Therefore, scholars argue that studies on authoritarianism in the 2 1 st century
concentrate not only on the function of governments within the light of quasi
elections but also on the power of media, the sustainability of legitimacy, pluralism,
kinds of elections, and reflection of all to the citizens and international order (Ezrow
2018). Moreover, academics should be able to judge the 'authoritativeness' of
governments not solely by how they came to power, or by the supposed
personality traits of the electorate, but also by what they do once they are in power.
The literature posits that rather than meaning and appearances, the
classification of dictatorship can lead us to avoid making inaccurate assumptions
.
of the path from democracy to authoritarianism (Conroy-Krutz and Frantz 2017).
.

The classification can be divided into two categories: categorical and continuous
(Ezrow and Frantz 2011 ) . Categorial can be divided as civilian, monarchic and
.
military; or personalist monarchic, dominant-party, and military (Cheibub, Gandhi,
.

and Vreeland 201 O; Geddes 1999). By contrast, continuous classification
considers authoritarianism as a continuum. In this system, such a country can be
placed on a scale from fully democratic to fully authoritarian. Therefore, the
concepts like competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002), hybrid
regimes (L. J . Diamond 2002), and electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2007) in this
category. The second categorization also allows institutions to measure
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democracy or authoritarianism (Freedom in the World 2018). In addition to
measurement, using the second category, scholars can easily posit whether a
country is moving towards democracy or authoritarianism (Conroy-Krutz and
Frantz 2017).
As stated above authoritarian regimes appeared in different ways and in
different forms. The period of Nazi's government, which brought World War II, was
named as totalitarian regimes. Following World War II. a similar but different
.

.

.

domination of the idea of authoritarian governments emerged as the Single
Dominant Party. Around the 70s and 80s,during the Cold War, military
dictatorships came to the surface. Foilowing the end of the Cold War, globalization
allowed democracy to spread easily; however, it changed the appearances of
democracy (Kendail-Taylor and Frantz 2014). Today, even though countries have
.
an option to elect their governance, a regime is questionably called as democracy
because citizens cannot enjoy the freedom of media, civic association, right to
speak etc.(Gandhi and Lust 2009).
Because authoritarianism would appear in different forms as in hybrid
regimes, citizens of authoritarian regimes may perceive that they are governed by
democratic regimes. In many modern types, authoritarian regimes adapt their rule
to some aspects of democratic institutions. Thus, they shaped their regime with
.

:

.

democratic basics to impress the dtizens (Slater and Fenner 201 1 ). Since this
shaping is successful, Ezrow claims that authoritarian governments are good at
concealing their nature; therefore, they are more resilient than ever (2018).
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The first common characteristic of quasi democratic countries is that they
hold electiqns without democratizing. Padrigu and Ezrow call this type as "cosmetic
democracy" (2018; Padrigu 2002). It means that whi!e strong governments apply
their rules behiqd the scene, they provide elections to citizens. The second
widespread choice of current authoritarian countries is that_ the way of controlling
the media. S_ome authoritarian .regir:nes.fi gu �ed o.ut the importance of the media,
.
which allows the government to control the flow of information. The main point of
controlling media is that while previous authoritarian governments did not put
limited pluralism on media, the r.ew ones pay lip service to independent media to
control the adversaries in the sector (Heinrich and Pleines 2018). Quasi pluralism
in every sector seems to promote civil liberties, elections, freedoms; however, it
more dangerously endangers the incomes of democracy. Ezrow posits that the
recent systems are neither fully democratic nor autocratic (2018).
As has been described, the �volution of authoritarianism makes thing ?
.
harde�. As �iamor:id stated . in his article, hybrid regimes ar.e m9re. prevalentJhan
ever (2002). Even though hybrid regimes clearly originated from flawed democratic
regimes, they are more prone to authoritarian regimes (Mufti 2018). Mufti
describes hybrid �egimes, which. has some democratic features, as authoritarian
.

.

reg,imes (201 8).
Even though measurement, progress or categorization of authoritarianism
is not related to this article aim, they allow us to understand the possession of the
two topic countries, Turkey and Venezuela.
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Reasons for Authoritarianism

As mentioned above, authoritarianism means that there are limited rights
for the public; therefore, for people who have been shifting their countries
government towards authoritarianism need reasons. To understand the reasons
for moving towards authoritarianism necessitates describing the basics of
authoritarianism. First, research shows that authoritarianism is correlated with

.
.
conservatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity (Adorno 1982). According to
William Eckhardt (Eckhardt 1991 ), Lentz's studies show that conservatives do not
l!ke change in any way. A summary of his study shows that "The conservative
[idelology] was more conventional, religious, moralistic, capitalistic, militaristic,
nationalistic, admittedly racially prejudiced, and presumably sexist."(Eckhardt
1 9 9 1 , 1 00). Eckhardt's unifying article on this subject shows that not only Lentz but
also numerous scholars have researched this field and got similar results.
Therefore, it can be noted that Eckhardt's demonstration on the essential elements
of authoritarianism as conser\tatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity. It is
necessary to take these dimensions into consideration.
Secondly, candidate preference, party preference, national and foreign
policy orientation and

political behaviors are also important factors for

authoritarianism. David J. Hanson examines these factors in his article (Hanson

.

.

1975) as a variable in political science studies. Even though Eckhardt and former
.
scholars have established links between conservatism and authorita rianism,
.
Hanson (1 975) believes there is more to authoritarianism than conservatism.
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Hanson suggests that the socioeconomic status of the public, family traditions in
..

-

countries, and social pressures also contribute to authoritarianism.
Along with researching the democratization process and dimensions of
democratic and autocratic regimes, scientists also study a country's stability. One
of the scholars who studies the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is
Myron Weiner. His research is a valuabie reference in · the field. For example,

Weiner (1 987) gathered practically every democratic theorist's ideas in

his article

to show the transition of countries to democracy. His main questions are "What
coalitions against authoritarian rulers are most likely to succeed? Is popular
support sufficient or is it also necessary to win over sections of the military and if
so how is that to be done?" (Weiner 1 987, 861 ). He answers these questions by
focusing on some countries which are still authoritarian. He also gives examples
·
c
from countrf es which are in the transition pr>cess. Despite this, many countries go
back to the process of democratization. Weiner and authors like him have not
realized this backward direction. To understand dernocracy, scholars are more
·
inclined to a � aiyze count ries, which had transition from authoritarian to dem ocratic
regime; however , the opposite appmach can be helpful to understand the
dimensions of the backward direction.
While scholars have contributed to our understanding of the contemporary
·
democracy and authoritarianism, very little research specificai ly focused on
reasons of returning authoritarian regimes by comparing countries. Even though
.
countries are on their way to an authoritarian regime, they do follow different paths
'

.

than each other. So far, scant resP.arch exists thatcomparesand contrasts the

24

reasons for authoritarianism in recent years. I explore the incentives of
authoritarianism by comparing Venezuela and Turkey to see if my argument
actually has merit.
Turkey
Past research indicates Muslims do not have any negative feeling about
living under libereral-democratic principles (Peucker 2018). However, some
scholars posit that Muslim countries are disadvantaged across all democracies
.
.
and democratization process (Fish 2002). They argue that the concept and
ideology of democracy is at odds with the values of Islam (Smock 2002). According
to Steven M. Fish's hypothesis (2002), "Muslim countries are democratic
underachievers" (p.4). As Turkey is a majority Muslim country, it should be
analyzed in the light of this information.
As has been discussed,

many definitions and techniques of the

measurement of democracy can be practiced. However, there is neither a specific
definition nor limit to measure democracy in the world. Reliable institutions have at
.
least a common criterion to measure for democracy. According to scholars who
.

believe that Muslim countries cannot pursue democratic achievement, these
·
criteria are an ·independent judiciary, economic development, free and fair
elections, freedom for press, etc. In this regard, while a few scholars and
philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Samuel H untington and Steven Fish, assume
that Islam cannot comply with democracy, other scholars would dissent from the
issue. One of the oldest political philosophers, Montesquieu, discussed Islam and
democratization over a 250 years ago.

Montesquieu claimed that while

25

Christianity presents its own justice, Islam only speaks with its sword (Secondat
Charles de 1 748). Some scholars, like Samuel Huntington ( 1 996) have maintained
Montesquieu's ideas about )slam and democracy. Fish (2002) has found out that
Muslim countries are not good at the democratic process and their understanding
of j_u.dicial system lacks the ability to democratize. With his empirical test, Fis�
.
.

.

argues that "Muslim countries are markedly more authoritarian than non-Muslim
societies."(Fish 2002, 37). This research demonstrates that while some scholars
claim the presence of conservatism creates negative effects on countries en route
to democratization, other scholars believe that Muslim countries have barely any
chance to continue their existence under a democratic regime.
In terms of the alleged fact between democracy and Islam, Turkey may be
the subject of the issue. International Religious Freedom Report 201 7 states that
according to the Turkish government. 99% of the population of Turkey is Muslim
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2017). Besides, data from
.
KONDA's, one of the leading data collectors of Turkey, supports the international
.

report. According to KONDA, 97.8% (KONDA 2009) of Turkish people define
.
themselves as Muslim. However, this percentage does not represent how the
.

country has been governed. Most of Muslim countries, though , either has been
fully or partially governed by sharia2 (Hurriyet 2016; Johnson and Sergie 2014).
While some of Muslims apply the sharia personal statues, like marriage, divorce
and child custody, others apply the sharia both for personal status and criminal
.

.

procedure (Otto 2008; Steiner 2002). However, Turkey is not one of them (Guercio

2

Shari is known Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of

the Prophet Mohammad.
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201 ?a).

Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state. Thus, religion and

government are two separate issues in Turkey. However, even though Islam is not
a formal element of government, it is used by political parties to get support
(Karakas 2007, 1 ) . As a result, Turkey's political climate has been defined as a
complex mixture since its foundation. Therefore, in order to understand Turkey's
political climate, the relationship between Islam and democracy must be examined
in terms of Turkey's position toward democracy.
If so, what are the conditions for democracy in Turkey? To understand
Turkey's political position today, consulting Turkey's history is essential (Guercio
201 ?a). Turkey's political disturbance began after the Ottoman Empire collapsed
and the Turkish Republic was founded. During the Ottoman Empire, society was
governed by shar ia like most of today's Muslim cour1tries. However, after the
foundation of the Turkish Republic, the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, introduced a new system to the Turkish people in 1928. This system was
called secularism, which is known as laicism in Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2016). While
sharia was used as the fundamental rule of law by the Ottoman Empire, laicism
separates religion and the affairs of state. Laicisrn is a political system which
excludes religious influences from the government. Not only does laicism
.
u
l
f
discourage rel g o s involvement in governments but also forbids the government
.

·
to be involved in any religious activities. Thus , the system was unfamiliar to the
.
people who had been governed by Islamic ieaders for almost 400 years. Although
almost 1 00 years passed since the foundation, secularism has been creating a
political d isturbance. Conversly, scholars who focus on Turkey, democracy, and
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democratization argue that laicism is fundamental for democracy and Turkey
(Saglar 2016). Therefore, it can be claimed that the authoritarian approach in
Turkey is derived from political d isturbance, i� o.ther words, the Turkish people do
_
not und� rstand laicism in the proper cultural context.
Venezuela
Since t_he relationship betv�een economic development and 9emocr�tic
improvement is seen a.s correlated, the relationship between these two factors
must be considered in order to understand Venezuela's democratic position.
Numerous political scientists claim that increasing economic power will lead
countries into a more democratic position. In this case, we can say that capitalism
promotes democracy and vice-a-versa. Scholars, who focus on the effect of the
economy on democracy indicate strong evidence to support this theory (L. Rivera
Batiz 2002). According to Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, democracy
can improve in the highly capitalist governments because those governments have
undergone dramatic industrialization, which brought bilateral relations between
countries. Correspondingly, bilateral relations countries have to communicate with
each other to trade, which entails mutually respected relations (Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens 1 992). in addition, outstanding scholars l!ke Lipset and
Przeworski claim that economic development would also bring political freedom
and democratic participation in governments (Lipset 1994; Przeworski 2004). On
the other hand, authors like Neubauer and Jackman found that there is no causal
relation between economic development and democracy (Jackman 1 973;
·

·
Neubauer 1967). In her research, Arat found that democracy is not affected by
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economic development (Arat 1 988). Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos assert that
economic freedom and political stability relate to democracy whether d irectly or
indirectly. Moreover, some scholars posit that an advanGed economy requires
more political rights (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2007).
·

Like Turkey, Venezuela has been subjected· to democratic consolidation.

However, unlike Turkey, Venezuela has been put under the microscope because
of its economic crisis. I n the 1950s; as the rest of Latin American countries were
struggling with economic depression, Venezuela had the second fastest growing
economy till 1980 (Desjardins 2017; Di John 2005). Yet, Venezuela has one of the
largest proven oil reserves. it has been perceived as a broken country, though
(OPEC : OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2017). Therefore, it has to be
·
:
·
scrutinized 'to understand its position towa rds democracy from the pont of
.
economic development and democracy relation.
If so, what are the economic conditions for democracy in Venezuela? Since
the colonial era, Venezuela has been a nation defined by its production of raw
.
materials for export. Hence, the source of their wealth has been always described
by Venezuelans as the production of raw materials. With the extraction of the first
oil in 1914, oil became the symbol of Venezue la's wealth and it still keeps its role
(Coronil 1 997). Lombardi describes the value of oil for Venezuelans both as a
curse and a blessing because as

a

colonized country, it has two dilemmas. First,

it has been dependent on foreign oil companies. Second, Venezuelans do not
know how to spend the wealth (Lombardi 1982). At the beginning of the '1 930's,
the production of agriculture had decreased 1 8% of GDP and oil represented 70%
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of all exports and by 1940, Venezuela became a net importer of food (Salas 2005).
Since that time Venezuela's economic policies have been questioning because
while high international · on prices mean social and political stability, falling prices
not only would affect the economy but also bring ·political instability.
.
Even though the research is limited· from 1989 to 201 0', it is important to
remember the oil industry has been effective since 1 914. Even today, Venezuela's
economy is derived from the· international oil trade (Desjardins 2017; Gackstetter
Nichols and Morse 2010). Hence, the foundation of OPEC, the Punto Fijo period,
the nationalization of oil reserves and the neoliberal economic politics before the
90's are parts of today's political stance of Venezuela.
When oil began to rain along Venezuela's border, people believed that this
black rain would be an absolute end of the dependency on foreign powers.
however. it was the beginning of the permanent dilemma. Venezuelan intellectual
and historian Arturo Uslar Piteri stated "Venezuela would become an unproductive
and idle nation. an immense petroleum parasite, swimming in a momentary and
corrupting abundance propelled toward and imminent and inevitable catastrophe"
(quoted in Coronil 1 997, 105)
With a 25.2 economic freedom score, Venezuela is ranked 1 79th freest
country in the world. This score is even worse than Cuba which is ranked 178th
(The Heritage Foundation 2018). In 2017, GDP contracted 12%, inflation
skyrocketed to 1 087.25% (See in Figure-4 below). At the end of the September
201 8 consumer prices rose 488.86 percent. According to the IMF's estimation this
rise could reach 1 000000% at the end of 2018 (Reuters 2018).
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The economic instability in Venezuela also has been creating a political
disturbance since the extraction of oil; however, the last issues almost lasted
longstanding democracy which endures since 1958. Therefore, it can be claimed
that the authoritarian approach in Venezuela is derived from economic instability.
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis and Methodology

Hypothesis

Democracy and democratic consolidation have been questioned since the
birth of democracy. There is still ambiguity whether democracy is the best system
to govern countries or not. Yet, the key concept is that the authoritarian regimes
do not offer exact freedom. However, while democracy research and discussions
lose their value in the field, d iscussion on authoritarianism and its proliferation are
on the rise. Therefore, the articles, news and popularity of authoritarianism lead to
a discussion of the dimensions of authoritativeness.

As Diamond stated in his book if "authoritarianism goes global" (L. Diamond,
Plattner, and Walker 2016), the requisite is that to find out the fundamental
structures of authoritarianism. Focusing on Turkey and Venezuela, the weight of
recent evidence points toward the following hypothesis:

H 1: While authoritarianism in Venezuela is related to economic issues while
authoritarianismin Turkey is related to politics.

Research on democracy and authoritarianism tested the building blocks of
these institutions; however,

I

believe that rather than testing abstract terms,

testing the application of abstract terms would be more effective. Even though,
the world is definitely increasingly authoritarian, there is an ambiguity whether
reasons of all countries are same. Therefore, my hypothesis will provide not only
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insight for the reasons of authoritarianism but also will enlighten the specific
reasons of authoritarianism for the subject countries.Therefore, to understand
why Turkey shifted from democracy to authoritarianism, I will compare it with
Venezuela, which is in the same category and has a similar background.
Data And Anaysis
Turkey and Venezuela are countries that have a low level of transparency.
Therefore, the most valuable data to understand their political stance may be
newspapers, NGOs research, social media discussions and quantitative data
which are taken from IMF, World Bank etc. Even though this research includes
quantitative parts, it will mostly be based on a case study comparing the two
countries political and economic progression. According to White "A lot can be
learned from comparing two cases, especially when they differ in some interesting
ways. The key issue is selecting two or more cases that are comparable in some
interesting way-similar circumstances but different results, a success and a failure,
contrasting circumstances" (White 1 999, 1 1 7).
White's description of comparative case study guides my research, given
well-documented differences in economy and political d isturbance, one of which
failed and one of which achieved marvelous success. Besides, Keohane, Verba and
King posit in their book "appropriately marshaling all the thick description and rich
contextualization in a typical qualitative study to evaluate a specific theory or
hypothesis can produce a very powerful research design" (King, Keohane, and
Verba 2010, 122). Moreover, Yin (Yin 2003, xi) addresses that "Case study research
is appropriate when investigators either desire or forced by circumstances a) to
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define research topics broadly and not narrowly, b) to cover contextual or complex
multivariate conditions and not just isolated variables, and c) to rely on multiple and
not singular sources of evidence." All three statements are pertinent to my research.
First, since the definition does not merely rely on democracy but also
authoritarianism, the broad definition provides a deep understanding of the countries
today's distance from democracy. Second, my research topic cannot be attributed
to only one or two variables because focusing on just one-two variables can mislead
me. Finally, since my sources are multiple, the case study should be the first method
of my research.
Revival of authoritarianism arises in the aforementioned countries after the
201 Os. The d iscussion about authoritarianism in Venezuela arose with the reelection
of Chavez in 2006, while the same discussion begun with a referendum which was
held in 2010 in Turkey. It is obvious that, the beginning of the Chavez administration
and the Erdogan administration will be the starting point of my research to clarify
these discussions. In addition to this, the summaries of their history are in the
literature review part. Therefore, as a time limitation, I will conduct my research for
Venezuela from 2006 to 201 7 , for Turkey 201 0 to 2017. I will use the news reports
notably from Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal (Turkish Newspaper), The Washington Post,
New York Times, Guardian etc.

Many books have been also written about the Hugo

Chavez Administration and Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration, most notably:
Venezuela (2010), Dragon in the Tropics (20 15), Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the
Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"(2007), Chavez's Legacy (2014), Bad News
From Venezuela (2018), Hugo Chavez and The Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and
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Democracy in Globalized Age (2009), Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and
Why (20 1 7), Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey(2009), the Emergence of
a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Party (2006), Why Turkey is authoritarian: from
Ataturk to Erdogan (2018), The New Sultan: Erdogan and the crisis of
Turkey (20 1 7) .

modem

By relying on such a massive array of book sources, I am able to

gain valuable perspective toward countries. By analyzing the countries, I will be able
to compare the countries progression. Hence, these collections of the books will
form the foundation of my comparative case study.
Also in this section of my thesis, I will apply my observations. The most
important part of observation will come in view within analyzing the coup attempt in
Turkey (2016) because

I

was an eyewitness to this attempt. The newspaper and

other resources did not publish what I experienced on the streets in July 1 5th, 2016.
My observation about the process and mechanism help me to understand the way
that countries become authoritarian. Brady, Collier And Seawright mentioned "the
strength of casual-process observation lies not in the breadth of coverage , but the
depth of insight" (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 24).
Moreover, to reveal an inclination towards authoritarianism, the following
indexes will be tested in findings: the nature of electoral processes (e.g. free
elections), functioning of government (e.g. checks and balances on government
authority), political participation (e.g. voter turnout), democratic political culture (e.g.
popular support for democracy) and Civil liberties (e.g. a free press, independent
judiciary) in a country. These indexes are gathered from Freedom House (Freedom
in the World 2018) and the Democracy Index (Democracy Index 2017). As discussed
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more than several times, there is no common ground for the measurement of
democracy; however, the above criteria are the things that all institutions and
countries can agree on those that are the fundamentals of democratic countries.
While the largest portion of my research will rely on qualitative analysis, I will
also test my hypothesis using graphs and charts. Using those data, I will gather a
few indexes together to demonstrate Turkey's and Venezuela's economic progress.
These statistical pieces of evidence will incorporate countries' GDP, inflation,
economic freedom and democratic ranking. They will assist me in seeing the big
picture of the research. Therefore, both the case study and statistical analysis
support my hypothesis.
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Chapter 4: Findings

Findings
Venezuela
From the 1 960s to 1 989
"Venezuela had been promoted as a model of democracy for Latin America"
(Ellner and Salas 2007, XIII); however, it is obvious that the Venezuelan
government had become insufficient to respond to the needs of the general
population in terms of politics and economy. So, while Venezuela was a
democratic model, then what happened in Venezuela in one night to trigger this
dramatic change?
Like Barber and Watson mentioned, "Democracies are rarely destroyed
from the outside" (Barber and Watson 1 988, 24). Hence, internal activities should
be the reason of transition from democracy to authoritarianism. However, there is
not a chance that the transition happened in one night neither in Venezuela nor in
Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the Venezuelan's today's regime, its
history needs to be analyzed first.
As is the case for all countries, the economy is a condition that empowers
the governments or vice versa. Although poverty dominates the country since the
colonial periods, Venezuela had ample natural resources that reduce the poverty.
These exportable natural resources have been influenced Venezuela's economy
and politics since the colonial period.
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While cacao has the most important role in the colonial period, coffee took
the cacao's role in the 1 9th century. Beginning with the 20th century, oil built the
national economy forsaking agricultural and industrial economic diversity
(Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). The most important factor is that while
coffee and cacao can be count as luxury goods, oil is a kind of necessity that is
used for industry, transportation , and even for the food production. Even though
export products vary, Venezuela's economic dependence to those products
remains unchanged since colonial time. The unchanged economic dependence on
export products means a national economic dependence on international pricing
(Alvarez and Hanson 2009; Amaro 2018). Thus, higher oil prices paved the way
for the good conditions for Venezuela's Economy. Besides, when the oil prices are
high, which means the flow of money to Venezuela is high, Venezuelan Presidents
took advantages investing oil revenues in social spending. In this point, the
economic rise brought the stable politics to Venezuela.
The oil defines the Venezuelan economy in the 20th and 21st century.
Wealth meant to Venezuelans agricultural terms before oil; however, oil quickly
became Venezuelan's present and future (Salas 2005). In 1935, while agriculture
had fallen to 18% of GDP, the oil took 70% of all GDP (Coronil 1 997, 1 1 7-18).
However, in earlier, Venezuela could not get enough profit from royalties of the oil
extraction. Even though extractinng oil began in 1 9 1 7, the economic influence of
oil came to play in 1 943 (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 201 O; Wilpert 2003).
During the Trienio3-Betancourt's administration, the oil ministry negotiations

3

Trienio; Three years democratic period from

1945 to 1 948.
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resulted in 50% profit sharing between-Shell, Gulf and Standard-and Venezuelan
state (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010, 55). Betancourt's main objective was
the nationalization of the oil industry, the nationalization did not become a reality
until 1976 (The New York Times 1 976). Betancourt and his party AD (Accion
Democratica-Democratic Action) believed that Venezuela's economy and politics
would become stabilized if Venezuela would trade its oil by itself. Romulo
Betancourt, who is also known as the founding father of modern democratic
Venezuela (Hecimovich 2017), began to advocate a democratic change in
Venezuela since 1936. He also believed that Venezuela could be governed
democratically over a more diverse economy by using oil resources (Hellinger
1991 ). In a nutshell, Betancourt's government promoted democracy through the
oil wealth and favorable relationships with the companies. Even though his first
term in office was short, the most important democratic politicians and policies
began in his term (Gackstetter N ichols and Morse 2 0 1 0).
Trienio did not last forever. Marcos Perez Jimenez began to rule the country
as a first unelected military leader, then as president from 1 948 to 1 958. Perez
believed that the good relationships between Venezuela and the North Atlantic
could make Venezuela's economy better. Thus, cooperation between the
companies and government were based on the illustration of U.S capital by
Jimenez. He made concessions to the U.S. By 1 957, while the oil production was
rising up, Venezuela simultaneously imported $695.4 million in consumer goods
from the USA (Salas 2005, 1 58). By 1955, Venezuela earned $232 million from
Carole alone, the leading oil company, and $7 billion totally from all the companies
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between 1 948 and 1 957 (Salas 2005, 1 59). Although Venezuela sacrificed high
profit in order to maintain good relations with the USA, the USA proceeded to
explore new oil resources. While the new resources meant more profit to the USA,
it meant risk for Venezuela's economy. The fluctuation of oil policies increased the
instability in Venezuela. Besides, when Jimenez's regime ended, the government
was in $1 billion recallable debt (Hellinger 1 99 1 , 98). Moreover, the urban
population boomed because Jimenez's administration spent the oil profits mostly
on urban construction projects. The increased population in urban areas created
urban middle classes. However, the gap between the rich and the poor got larger
(Ewell 1 984). Most importantly the ranchitos4, which were started to be built on the
Caracas valley during Jimenez's administration will be the building blocks for the
Hugo Chavez's dictatorship.
After the dark times, Jimenez's regime unchecked corruption which was the
beginning of social inequality and political oppression, Venezuelan enjoyed the
longest period of democracy between 1 959 and 1 989 which is called partidocracia
(The New York Times 1 992). It cannot be claimed that it was a flawless democracy;
however, it can be said that those were the longest stable years since
independence (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 201 O; lrazabal and Foley 2010).
The period started with signing the Pact of Punto Fijo (Gomez Ramirez 2015;
Gunson 2010). The parties, individualist groups, the military, and the churches
realized that the lack of unity during the

Trienio

provided an opportunity to Perez

Jimenez to seize the power. In order to secure democracy, therefore, parties

4 Houses in which the poor people live and those houses were made from cement blocks.
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including AD (Accion Democratica), COPEi (Comite de Participacion Electoral
lndependiente-Social Christian Party) and URD (Union Republicana-Democratic
Republican Union) admit to sharing the governance signing the Pact of Punto Fijo
(Ewell 1984; Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010; Gomez Ramirez 20 1 5;
Hellinger 1 991 )

.

Because Jimenez administration was so busy filling their pocket through
construction projects, the first

partidocracia

government inherited the largest

budget deficit (Ewell 1 984). Therefore Betancourt, the first president of the period,
increased lower international oil prices to close the budget deficit. Besides, he
raised tariffs on imports product to encourage producing other industrial goods like
steel and aluminum. By that time the USA, a close ally of Venezuela, declined
Venezuela's request for sharing of global imports. Thus, one rejection paved the
way for an international organization for countries that export petroleum. So, OPEC
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) was founded under the
leadership of Venezuela (Coronil 1 997). During the foundation of OPEC,
Venezuela's share of the global oil market was diminishing. While Venezuela was
producing 38.4% of the world's crude oil in 1 955, this percentage became 24.3 in
1 965. Consequently, the average price per barrel dropped from $2.65 to $1 .81
between 1 957 and 1969. Venezuela could have rectified this mistake by increasing
production to a high of 3,708,000 a day in 1 970. So, the percentage of oil
representation became 66.4% of in 1967 (Hellinger 1 9 9 1 , 1 00). As a result, the
establishment of the OPEC's aim was to control both the oil production and
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economic future of the petroleum exporting countries (Knes 1 998; OPEC : Our
Mission 1960).
Total Petroleum and Other Liquids Production - Venezuela
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FIGURE- 1 : Total petroleum and other liquids production - Venezuela
Source: Author's calculation based on data from U.S Energy Information
Administration, Accessed November 25,2018

Beginning with the USA's desire for another preferred supplier, the
relationship between the USA and Venezuela was oscillating until the USA's
decision to change its preferred oil supplier to Canada. Then Venezuela gave up
playing with the USA; rather it strengthened its relations with OPEC. As a result,
OPEC gained the right to set prices on international oil and established the fixed
production level. When the Arab-Israeli Wars began, OPEC's power was at its
peak. The price of crude oil for Venezuela exploded to $10.31 per barrel and the
government's revenues reached 1 70%. These years were called the Golden Age
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qf Oil (Hellinger 1 9 9 1 , 1 22-23). During the Golden age, the Perez administration
increased government expenditures relying on high petroleum income. Between
1 974 and 1 978, the public expenditures grew 96.9% and by 1978 only 10% of the
people lived under poverty in Venezuela

(The Global

Economy n.d.).

Consequently, while the current account balances had $8 billion surpluses in 1 974,
it had a $6 billion deficit in 1 978 (Kazokoglu 2017). By 1 974, OPEC took one more
step away from global oil prices regulation and moved toward nationalization of the
oil reserves. Even though all politicians in Venezuela did not agree on the issue,
the nationalization law was approved in 1 976. Perez thought that nationalization
might be a solution to the huge deficit (Kazokoglu 201 7).
The nationalization created PDVSA (Petroleos De Venezuela Sociedad
Anonima-Petroleum of Venezuela). Nevertheless, PDVSA maintained a reliance
on foreign technical expertise. Besides, the USA was still the primary buyer of the
country's crude oil. Associated with

nationalization,

a commercialization

agreement was signed between companies and Venezuela. According to the
agreement, the oil companies were allowed to receive 88% of PDVSA's production
proportional to their status prior to the

nationalization.

Therefore; the

nationalization left a small percentage of profit share to Venezuela. Moreover,
Venezuela had to increase its oil production level to raise its profit share. Thus, the
nationalization made Venezuela dependent solely on oil production. As a result,
the nationalization of oil prevented Venezuela from diversifying their economic
resources (Hellinger 1 991 , 1 22-24). Despite all of these, the government
continued

to spend

money unconcernedly on public expenditures. The
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government pursued populist policies and invested its income in health care,
nutrition, water supplies, and finally advanced rural housing. Moreover, the
government emphasized the importance of education and invested money in
public education. While the literacy rate had been 60.8% in 1 958, it rose to 89.8%
in 1 990 (Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 1 5 and above) I Data n.d.). In
addition, higher education became important and the government made an
investment for it too. Even more, working-class Venezuelans enrolled in
universities in the 1 980s. The percentage of university students who came from a
working-class background was 36% in 1 991 (Reimers 1 991 ). Because of
economic rise, according to political scientist and historians, Venezuela had
experienced exceptionalism during the 20th century. That exceptionalism brought
stabilized and healthy democracy; however, the direction of the democracy veered
when the money stopped flowing (Ellner and Salas 2007, 8-13). Yet, there is one
thing that should not be forgotten; even though social spending created the middle
class, the gap between the poor and the rich grew too.
In the 1970s government propped up public expenditures in education,
health care, and social security. Moreover, the government subsidized the fuel and
food industry. Therefore, people not only could buy stable foods, like milk and flour
easily but also used the transportation anytime conveniently. So, the 1970s were
known as the era of richness for Venezuelans. However, the oil boom did not last
forever and when the calendar showed the 1980s, the international demand for oil
was decreasing. So, the oil income was inadequate not only to satisfy the people's
need but also in order to produce profits from the heavily capital-intensive oil
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industry. Therefore, the government borrowed heavily from the World Bank, IMF,
and foreign lenders like Citibank (Ellner and Salas 2007). While Venezuela's
industries acquired 60% of their capital from credit, only 1 9% was from its own
earnings (Hellinger 1 99 1 , 146). Venezuela was in a difficult political position
because it had to find a way to pay for loans while satisfying the people's need.
For that reason, the government had to borrow more money with higher interest
rates to pay old debts. Though the Campins's administration made a commitment
to increase public expenditures to allay growing poverty 74% by 1983, the
government began to devaluate Bolivar (1 983) and cut the public expenditures in
health care and education (Rosati and Zerpa 2018). With climbing unemployment,
the people could not send their children to schools. Therefore, the literacy rate was
decreasing among the poor again. The increasing debt number skyrocketed from
$9 billion to $24 billion during Campins administration (Coronil 1 997, 370).
Moreover, in order to compensate for some social spending, the government
reduced agricultural subsidies which increased food prices. The poor, who works
with minimum wages could not afford to buy some staple foods (Ellner and Salas
2007).
On one hand, the growing economic crisis became more public in 1 989.
The poorer grew poorer and the middle class disappeared; where the rich grew
richer. Between 1 981 and 1997, the income share of the poorest 40% of the nation
fell from 1 9 . 1 % to 14.7%, while the income share of the wealthiest 1 0% of the
nation increased from 21 .8% to 32.8% (Roberts 2003, 60). On the other hand, with
the democratization Venezuela experienced its economic liberalization between
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1 989 to 1 998. In the increasing division between classes, the people were hoping
to see a bright future with next president Carlos Andres Perez, who became a hope
for them (Marquez 2003, 200). He was re-elected to take Venezuelans back to the
good times like he was the president in the 1 970s. Even though he was accused
of corruption, Venezuelans were very reluctant to believe him. Besides, he was a
charismatic leader who would claim international organizations like the IMF and
World Bank as a reason of Venezuelan economic crisis. Once he called the IMF
"a bomb that only kills people" (Coronil 1 997, 375). However, he made an
agreement with IMF and accepted IMF's austerity program, which is called
Paquete"

"El

behind closed doors. At that time, Venezuela owed $33 billion to

international creditors (Coronil and Skurski 1 9 9 1 , 293). With the package, Perez
reduced tariffs, began privatization in 64 public entries (Hellinger 1991 , 146), most
importantly increased the price of the fuel by 30% (Roberts 2003). Moreover, these
austerity reforms caused increased inflation and unemployment. In this regard,
corruption and differences of distribution of income increased.
Because of these factors, the public took the streets to protest Perez and
his economic reforms. This protest, which is called

Caracazo

was a kind of riot

against the government because the liberalization period not only affected
Venezuela's economy but also created an uncertainty and a political tension.
Thousands of people participated in the protest in Caracas and other major cities.
The military deployed during demonstrations to protect wealthy people from any
predicament (Coronil 1997, 1 1 4). Further, the state described the people who
were in the riots as drug dealers, thugs, and urban guerillas. The people, who were
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masked (suspected to be the undercovered police officer) shot people escalating
the general state of terror (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 1 1 7). In the end, according
to official reports, 277 Venezuelans died; however, the suspected real number is
1 ,000 people (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 85).
By 1989, the

Caracazo

riots displayed that the system which was created

i n 1 959 was not working for the poor people. During the protest, writing on the
walls identified that socioeconomic problems created political problems and the
poor people which are the greater part of the population demanded solutions for
them (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 1 1 0-1 1 ) . The system was working until the
decreased oil demand. It was absolutely obvious that corruption existed;
nevertheless, power sharing between parties, investigating in health, and
increased education gave hope to the people between 1 960s and 1 970s. Though
the democratic system was impressive for all Venezuelans, since the end of the
oil boom poverty significantly increased. Between 1984 and 1 989, the poverty rate
increased from 46% to 62%. Moreover, the percentage of the population who lived
in extreme poverty rose from 14% to 30% (Roberts 2003).
The riot was the first strike for a democratic government. The second strike
came with the coup attempt which was generated by Movimiento Revolucionario
Boliviariano

(MRS-Revolutionary

Bolivarian

Movement)

group

under the

leadership of Lieutenant Hugo Chavez Frias and Francisco Arias Cardenas on
February 4, 1 992. They portrayed themselves as a group which was against
corruption and unjust distribution of power and money. However, the government
overrided the attempt and jailed almost all of the plotters. Even though the coup
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failed, Chavez and his friends would get support among the Venezuelan people.
Further, the citizenry was happy to see that there was still a hope to be recovered
economically and politically (Marquez 2003). As a result, the strikes beginning with
Caracazo

established a ground for new political landscape.

By 1 993, Perez was impeached for corruption and adultery accusations.
During that time, Rafael Caldera emerged as a leader who was opposed to the
neoliberal economic policies. He even claimed that "it is difficult to ask people to
burn for freedom and democracy while they think freedom and democracy are not
able to feed them . . . " (Hellinger 2003, 32). However, Venezuela still experienced
neoliberal reforms until "the emergence of Hugo Chavez as a president in 1998"
(John 2005, 1 1 1 ) and poverty continued to increase.
Hugo Chavez and his team were free to run for the next election in 1 998.
His campaign was spectacular. He based it on a Bolivarian doctrine5, is also known
as Bolivarianism. and portrayed himself as a "man of the people" (Gackstetter
Nichols and Morse 2010, 87). In his campaign, Chavez used election music which
had anti-elite and anti-oligarchic rhetoric. (Di John 2005, 1 1 6). The citizens
accepted him as one of them because he was not highly educated, and his parents
were not one of the elites. Because he wanted to show that he was one of the
lower classes, he used language like how the poor people use. Finally, he
promised to change the constitution in favor of the poor citizens. Therefore, the
people believed that Chavez was the leader who will bring whole change for
Venezuela. In the end, Chavez won the election with 56% majority in 1998 (Left-

5

Bolivarianism is an idea against imperialism, inequality and co1TUption. It also describes the dream of

United Latin American Countries (Tavukcu 2019).
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wing populist Chavez wins Venezuelan presidency 1 998). So, Venezuela's journey
towards authoritarianism had begun.
Starting

with the constitutional change, Chavez forever changed

Venezuela's policies. When he was elected, changing the previous system was
not difficult for him because the country was struggling economically. The GDP
had reverted to the level of the 1950s in 1998.
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FIGURE-2: GDP per capita growth between 1960-2014
Source: Author's calculation based on data from Central Bank of Venezuela
By 1 998, extreme poverty increased from 44.4% in 1 989 to 57.6% and the
price of oil per barrel was the lowest (see in Figure-1 ) in decades-almost $8 dollar
per barrel (Corrales and Penfold 2015, 18). Though he could have begun the
changes with economic policies, he preferred to focus on rewriting the constitution
looking for more presidential power. Thus, Chavez first active movement was to
sign a decree which called for a referendum to change the constitution or to call
the Constitution Assembly (Partlett 201 3). At that time, in order to change or reform
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any article in the constitution, the two-thirds vote of the Congress was a
requirement. However, there were not enough seats in the chamber or senate. So,
he called for a consultative referendum. Even though the decree for a consultative
referendum was challenged by his opponents, the court decided that it would be
"bound to the spirit of the constitution in force, and therefore is limited by the
fundamental principles of the democratic state of law" (Partlett 2013, para. 4 ). With
the consultative referendum, Chavez bypassed the Congress to rewrite the
constitution. As a result of the court's decision, the referendum was held in April
1 999 and approved by over 87% of the national vote. Thus, Chavez got the power
to hold the Constitution Assembly and he could elect delegates to the assembly
(Corrales and Penfold 2015, 19; Rohter 1999). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
suspended the Congress because the court would not feel powerful enough to
reject the wishes of the popularly elected president (Lansberg-Rodriguez 2016).
Even though the judiciary fought for protecting checks and balances, they were too
late.
At the end of the election for the new constitutional assembly, Chavez's
movement won 1 2 1 of the 1 3 1 seats. This triumph gave seats to Chavez's wife,
brother, his former military colleagues and his former cabinet members (Rohter
1 999, para. 1 0). Soon after the new Constituent Assembly approved the "national
declaration of emergency" (Partlett 2013, para. 6). By the emergency declaration,
the assembly dismissed many judges who had been accused of corruption, with
their replacements being more supportive of the Chavez administration. (Partlett
2013). With the majority, it was not hard to draft the new constitution, which is
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called the Bolivarian constitution. According to the new constitution, the president
would have more power than the other branches of government and the traditional
parties. The presidential term expanded from 5 years to 6 years, reelection was
enabled, and the president alone could give promotions without legislative
approval. Because the Senate was eliminated, the checks and balances were lost.
Moreover, the president achieved limitless power to call a referendum. As it is
seen, the new constitution was designed way far from political reconciliation and
democratization (Brewer-Carias 201 0). After the long period of democratic
government, the first act of Chavez developed suspicion about the fairness of
official institutions (Karl 1 987).
After ratifying the new constitution, Chavez was capable of being reelected.
He desired to clean not only national level seats but also state level seats under
his leadership. Therefore, he called for a mega-election in July 2001. Chavez and
his party acquired 59% vote for the presidency and 60% seats for the National
Assembly (Corrales and Penfold 2015). By that time, the most important factor was
his election rhetoric. While he was still mentioning the solutions for poverty and
class divisions, his rhetoric of opposition parties had racist undertones (Gackstetter
Nichols and Morse 201 0). After the mega election, the Chavez administration
introduced a project, Plan Bolivar 200. The project aimed to solve social problems,
like sanitation, health care, housing, and transportation. Within Plan Bolivar, social
spending on education increased by 4.3% between 1 998 and 2001 (Ellner and
Salas 2007). Although the project was effective in the short-term, it was terminated
by coup attempt which is held in 2002. After the coup attempt, Chavez tendered
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his resignation from the presidency. Since he resigned, all his plans, including Plan
Bolivar, were reversed to pre-Chavez period by the interim president, Pedro
Carmona.
Chavez aimed to cooperate with all countries which were developing
nations. However, he refused to be a provider of raw materials. He even
questioned trade agreements with NAFTA. His policies were called independent
foreign policy which was the exact opposite of the previous democratic government
since 1959. His stance towards the US, the international economic institution like
IMF, and World Bank strengthened his support among the poor.
At the end of 1 999, when Chavez was elected president of Venezuela, its
political ratings in Freedom House worsened from 2 to 4, its civil liberties from 3 to
4, and its status changed from Free to Partly Free. The given ratings were
understandable when Chavez was examined for what he did. He dismantled
checks and balances, dominated the constituent assembly, ratified a new
constitution, made it possible to stay in power until 2013, and finally dismissed the
Congress and the Supreme Court. Therefore, even though the regional and
presidential elections were held freely and fairly, those circumstances made
Venezuela from a free country to a partly free country (Freedom House 1999).
The most important factor in controlling

power by Chavez occurred in

December 2001 . When Chavez was elected, he wanted to revitalize the economy
without foreign institutions' aid. For his desire and his new programs, he increased
the revenues which came from oil. Thanks to the new legislation system, Chavez
had authority to direct oil policy. He, therefore, assigned to PDVSA a new
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president, Ali Rodriguez who was a sympathizer of Chavez. Ali Rodriguez also
appointed many new board members who were sympathizer of Chavez too
(Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). While some people appreciated that the
PDVSA would have more closely controlled the PDVSA, others questioned the
qualification of the new management board members. The opposition parties took
advantages of PDVSA's current position and they called for an indefinite general
strike (See in Figure-3). The managers who were working in the PDVSA but not
the sympathizer of Chavez began the strike. Not only did PDVSA shut down the
industry, but also other companies did. Businessmen in the elite and middle
classes organized in favor of opposition against the Chavez administration
(Thompson 2003). The members of the opposition owned all the major media,
except state-owned radio and television. They used the media to organize the
protest for the strike. Using the media power proved that the populism was not
fundamental for Chavez's dictatorship; rather he used the economic conditions to
take under control of the nation. The strikes that happened in 2002 and 2003
served his purposes. In the protest, two groups- the poor and the elite met, and
violence erupted. The chaos allowed military to detain Chavez on April 1 1 , 2002
(An Opposition Gagged 2007). Although the majority of the population, the poor,
turned against the military demanding the releasing of the president, their protest
was not sufficient to bring back Chavez. One night later, the FEDECAMARAS
leader Pedro Carmona was accepted as the president (Forero 2002) Even though
the USA recognized his presidency, the international pressures and some armed
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forces who were unwilling to support anti-democratic presidency forced Carmona
to resign. As a result, Chavez returned to the presidency.
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FIGURE-3: GDP per capita of Venezuela between 1990-2014
Source: Author's calculation based on data from the Central Bank of Venezuela

The opposition, however, were determined to take Chavez's presidency.
They called the second strike in December 2002. This strike lasted more than the
first attempt - two months. Therefore, oil and gas production almost stopped.
PDVSA and other oil companies produced 40,000 barrels oil in a day rather than
producing 3.2 million barrels (The Economist 2003, para. 2). Therefore, the
revenues from oil decreased and food shortages began. In January 2003, the
economic data showed that Venezuela's economy lost $50 million a day
(Thompson 2003). Moreover, the production equipment damages cost around $3
billion (Camacho 2005, paras. 6-7). During the strike, some PDVSA employees

54

lost their jobs. Thus, people realized that they were going to lose whatever they
had economically if they had another strike.
After a while, businessmen were forced to close their businesses. Once
Chavez realized the situation, he reopened the oil companies using military power.
The citizens were happy because the production of oil increased to 2 million barrels
a day (Ellner 2003). In total, the country lost $12.8 billion during the strike
(Camacho 2005). Since the nation suffered from the strike, the people believed
that the oppositions were not willing to empower the country, rather they were
destructive. Further, Chavez's rhetoric during the strike brought advantages to him.
During the strike, Chavez claimed that the oil was the legacy of the nation, PDVSA
should not govern the oil economy without government control. As a result, at the
end of the strike, Chavez subjugated the PDVSA and hired all employees who
were loyal to him. Getting control of the PDVSA meant controlling the oil income
for Chavez. Chavez used the PDVSA's revenues for social spending. In 2007,
PDVSA spent $14.4 billion for social expenditures like education and healthcare
(Alvarez and Hanson 2009). Corrales (2006) claims that Chavez updated
authoritarianism controlling PDVSA's revenues. In other words, Venezuela's
authoritarianism began with becoming an oil-based country (Egilmez 2017).
In 2004, Chavez won one more victory against the opposition taking
advantages of his economic aid to the poor. The opposition collected more than
enough signatures- 3.4 million in December 2003- to recall for a presidential
referendum (Corrales 2006). Nevertheless, though the opposition collected
enough votes-3.7 million votes "YES" to reelect the president, "NO" votes
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outnumbered the "YES" votes by 5.8 million (Carter Center 2005). Many analysts
and researchers including Sujatha Fernandes claimed that Chavez held power
because the poor loved him. Moreover, Fernandes (2007) posits that Chavez's
subsidized social programs were a decisive factor for his victory in 2004 (Corrales
2006; Fernandes 2007). According to Freedom House 2005 report, the 2004
victory directed Chavez to increase "his influence over the judicial system, media,
and other institutions of the society" (Freedom House 2005). High oil prices in 2004
allowed Chavez to increase social expenditures which were the highest in Latin
America in 2006. While 8.2% of the GPO was social spending in 1998, Chavez
increased this number from 8.2% to 21 .9% of GDP by 2006 (Weisbort and
Sandoval 2007).After 2004, Chavez aimed to change all economic policies related
to oil. If the foreign oil companies would like to maintain trade in Venezuela, they
had to give 60% share to the state. Further, PDVSA's employees were chosen by
him (Ellner 2003).
In 2006, Chavez won the election with 63% of the vote while the turnout
rate was 75% (Al Jezeera Turk 2013). From time to time, Chavez claimed that the
nationalization of other oil companies along with PDVSA would increase the
government's profit from 40% to 60% (Alvarez and Hanson 2009). After the
election, in 2007, relying on the increased number of share and his voting rate,
Chavez wanted one more reform on the constitution. The draft of this reform
included the indefinite elections for president, the presidential appointment of
states governors, and declining unlimited states of emergency; however, for the
first time since 1 999 Chavez could not win the election (see in Figure-5). Despite
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his first defeat, Chavez's program on social spending with good oil prices made
him irreplaceable in the eyes of the poor (Hellinger 2003). His social spending
proved his promises towards the poor. Offering the unreachable social programs,
Chavez was able to manipulate the poor. Though the people and Chavez gained
benefit from the social expenditure program, they were not in the best interest of
the nation (The Economist 2006).
Moreover, the state turned its neoliberal economic policies to socialist
policies in 2006. As a result of the change, the government nationalized not only
the oil companies but also phone company-CANN in 2006 and Steel Company
SIDOR in 2009. Further, Chavez's named his economic policies "Socialism in the
Twenty-First Century". He guided the monetary and banking policies regarding to
socialist policies. When crude prices were $100 per barrel, neither economic nor
political problems came to the surface. Since oil prices were high, the VEB (the
official currency of Venezuela) was valuable. While using the valuable VEB on
social spending was easier, it made Venezuela import-based economy (Egilmez
2017).
After the general strike, Chavez promulgated a new series of social
packages called

misiones

for the poor. These social reforms were Chavez's

fundamentals. There were 27 missions which provided healthcare, education,
scholarships, and food funding. By 2007, funding for the missions in total
accounted for 3.5% of Venezuela's GDP which may be the largest social spending
program in Latin American history (Corrales and Penfold 2007). Although
programs are successful, they were not sustainable because they were dependent
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on oil prices around the world. As it is seen in Figure-1 , the country experienced
incredible oil production in its history during the Chavez administration. That rise
in oil production explains how Chavez used oil revenue until 2008. As a
consequence of economic crisis in 2008, social expenditures had been cut. The
administration tightened economic policies, exchange and interest rate. Strict
controls on economic policies caused for food shortages and economic slowdown.
The inflation rate doubled (see in Figure-4). Today, the economists predict that by
the end of the year Venezuelan inflation can hit one million percent (Amaro 201 8).
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The opponents of Chavez won the referendum with slight vote difference in
2007. Chavez was determined to pass the new legislation and he proposed the
referendum package one more time in 2009. Despite his declining approval rate,
he won the referendum in 2009 (See in Figure-5). As a result of the referendum,
Chavez would stay forever in the presidency. Unlike the referendum held in 2007,
where Chavez just tried to remove the term limit for the presidency, in 2009 he
widened the referendum package referring that not only the president but also
mayors and governors would not be term limited. Therefore, he received 54.85%
of constituent approval (Venezuela'daki Referandumda Chavez Zaferi 2009). This
change decreased Venezuelan Political rights score from 4 to 5 in Freedom House
(Venezuela 201 O Scores 2010).

Voting Rates of Chavez

1998 p

2000 RE

2006 p

2009 R

2010 PE

2012 p

FIGURE-5: Voting rates of Chavez
P: Presidential Elections, RE: Reelection, R : Referendum, PE: Parliamentary
Elections
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Source: Author's calculation based on Newspaper official statements for
Venezuela's election
After getting all power in his hands, Chavez could not control the economic
problems. Since he cut the social expenditures, the food shortages exacerbated
the problems. The citizens not only had food problems but also suffered from
electricity and water shortages. In short, people could not meet their basic needs.
As a result of the circumstances, Chavez's party lost its majority in 2010
parliamentary elections. That means he would not be able to leg islate whatever he
desired. It is clear that whenever Chavez could not affort buying people's votes
through social expenditures, he lost his popularity. Yet, the citizens did not
abandon him totally because they were in faith that Chavez was ceased by
external forces (Hugo Chavez ve Venezuela se9imleri Ozerine 2012). His
announcement about his illness softened opposition. When he declared his
candidacy for the next election, the people supported him (Carroll and Lopez
2012). Consequently, he received 55 . 1 % of votes. He was supposed to take an
oath in January 2013; however, his cancer relapsed. Though the inauguration
ceremony postponed, he could not take an oath. He died on March 2013 at the
age of 58.
Even though this analysis is to the Chavez administration, it is important to
indicate that Chavez passed on all his authoritarian policies to his successor.
When Chavez declared Nicolas Maduro as his successor, it was obvious that he
was willing to make the country more authoritarian. Therefore, Nicolas Maduro
took over the government temporarily. He was elected as president in April 2013.
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When Maduro came into power, he devalued Venezuela's currency. This situation
increased the price of staple goods (Caracas 2013). In 2014, a huge economic
decline took place in Venezuela. Venezuela had the world's highest inflation rate
in 201 5 (Flannery 2015). The economic problems also increased the rate of crime
and corruption. Venezuela encountered popular protests across the country, and
the hundreds of protesters were killed in those protests between 2015 to 2017
(Turkce 2017). As a result of the changes, the Freedom House ranked Venezuela
as a "Not Free" country in 201 7 (Freedom House 2017) because Chavez made
easier for Maduro to take everything under control.
According to Freedom House, Venezuela's democratic institutions began to
deteriorate since 1 999 when Chavez was elected for the first time as president.
Maduro desired to expande took it one step further by expanding all rights granted
to the president in the new constitution . The Supreme Tribunal Justice annulled
the National Assembly in 20 1 7 . Even though the decision was reversed, Maduro
superseded the National Assembly with a National Constituent Assembly whose
members were chosen despite the opposition boycott. Many political adversaries
were prisoned. The number of imprisoned exceeded 600. Finally, there is not a
thing that can be related to human rights or democracy. Today, Venezuela is a
place where its citizens eat rotten meat (BBC News 2018).
Turkey
The Turkish Republic was founded in 1 923 after the collapse of Ottoman
Empire. As a unique country, Turkey incorporates European and Middle Eastern
cultures together. The complexity of those cultures has been one of the major
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issues in Turkey since its foundation. Another issue is nationalism. Nationalism
and religion became the corner stones of the new republic (Karakas 2007). These
religious-national identities of Turkey originate from Kemalism. Kemalism is a kind
of ideology that its followers believe Ataturk's main ideas and his practices should
shape the Republic of Turkey (Hanioglu 2012).

In this regard, the Turkish

Constitution describes Turkey as democratic, secular and loyal to the nationalism
of Ataturk (TBMM 1982). These corner stones paved the way for the current
president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become authoritarian.
The founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is known as the builder
of the division between piety and non-piety citizens in Turkey. Since he removed
religion from politics accepting a laic regime in 1 928, Ataturk's supporters believe
that he shifted Turkey to more modern world, where his adversaries contend that
he disenfranchised Turkish by taking away their freedom of religion (Oztig 201 8).
Since the foundation of the republic, laicism determined to modernize the Turkish
people; however, rather than performing its real objective, laicism caused higher
polarization between conservative-religious and Kemalist-secular (Hale and
Ozbudun 2 0 1 1 ). Ataturk dictated a single party regime to apply a secular regime
in the future. Thus, he adopted new secular laws. He closed the religious schools
medrese

and religious courts-kad1/1k

milessesesi,

adopted the Gregorian

calendar, changed the Ottoman alphabet to the Latin alphabet, made Sundays as
a holiday instead of Friday which is a holy day for Muslims and the Ezan, which is
Islamic call to worship was made Turkish rather than Arabic for a short time, but it
has begun to be recalled in Arabic later. Moreover, he believed in modernized
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institutions. Therefore, he replaced Islamic laws with western style-civil laws (ATA
TSK n.d.). The Turkish people acknowledged almost all changes except the
change of the dress code which is related to the headscarf and Turkish

Ezan.

Since the Ataturk administration's ruling elite was formed by political
bureaucrats, military actors and civil servants and they were secularist while the
conservatives were excluded from the administration. (Hale and Ozbudun 201 1 ) .
In addition, since Turkey experienced many military coups to protect laicism, the
Turkish military became the advocator and protector of Kemalist ideas (Selc;uk
2016). Until 2013, the headscarf ban stayed active. Therefore, it had caused
political turmoil. Solving the headscarf problem paved the way for the dictatorship
of Erdogan (Hakan 2013).
Secularism is a kind of Western ideology which allows people to escape
from religious pressure (Hallward 2008). Even though aim of secularism was to
organize the relationship between religion, politics and society, the different kinds
of interpretation occurred in societies (J. Butler et al. 201 1 ). Moderate secularism
is interpreted freedom of religious expression, and it also allows the separation of
religion and politics (Ertit 2014; Lovell 2009). However, the laic version of
secularism was never interpreted as freedom of religion until 2013 in Turkey. On
the contrary, laicism accepted that the display of any religious emblem is forbidden.
As a result, beginning with the leadership of Ataturk, subsequent military leaders
felt as a guardian of laicism accepted the extreme interpretation of secularism.
Since secularism is interpreted with an iron fist, it was not only effective in the
military, but also was effective in schools, universities and public offices in Turkey.
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The public face of Ataturk principle's became headscarf ban. The ban also divided
society between religious and secular.
After a long single party regime, Turkey politics was transferred into a two
party democracy in 1 950 (Musil 2015). The DP (Democrat Party), which was
center-right party won the election held in May 1950. Because of their political
stance, they showed concern about freedom of religion. The party criticized the
interpretation of secularism and emphasized the importance of Islam for Turkish
culture. Thus, they reopened the Imam Hatip high school, which were schools of
theology, based on Islamic discipline (Karaman 201 5). However, a Junta
administration took the government under their control in 1 960 pretending
application and legislation of the new laws were against the Ataturk's principles,
so against secularism (Alkan 2016). The administration returned to civil authority
in 1 961 with the elections. Moreover, a new constitution, which is known as the
most liberal constitution ever in Turkey, was written. The new constitution
transformed the two-party system in multi-party system (Karpat 1 970; Ozbudun
1 996). Even though the new constitution was the most libertarian one, secularism
kept its position. The military coup gave the memorandum for resignation of the
old government in 1 97 1 . The following government was not able to produce
political stabilization. As a result, a military coup occurred one more time in
September 12, 1980 ( 1 2 EylUI darbesinin oncesi ve sonrasmda ya�ananlar 2015).
After the coup, a new constitution was established. The new constitution
took out the libertarian part of the 1 961 constitution and strengthened the
presidency of the republic. With the 1980 coup, the headscarf ban became more
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strict. Junta leader Kenan Evren began a headscarf ban in universities using the
Iranian revolution as a reason. He even stated that "if showing the women's hair is
sin, God would create them bald." (Hakan 2013; Kenan Evren'den torbana ilgin9
91k1� 2008). However, conservative people, especially women, were not pleased
with the change. When the military regime ended center-right liberal party ANAP
(Motherland Party) came to the power under the leadership ofTurgut Ozal. Without
analyzing Turgut Ozal administration, it cannot be understood how Erdogan has
been changing Turkey towards democracy to authoritarianism. Turgut Ozal is
known for his liberal economic policies because his neoliberal policies completely
created new political identities. Conservative-religious groups became stronger
and got a voice to raise both in

politics and in industry (Yavuz 2009). Ozal was

the ffrst prime minister, who disagreed with extreme Kemalism, which means
extreme secularism and nationalism (Ataman 2000). In his term, Ozal consolidated
a relationship not only with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) but also
with the European Union (EU) (Ataman 2000). Some posited that what Ozal did
was an incomprehensable dilemma. However, advanced relations with the OIC
and the EU decreased the one-way dependence relations among Turkey, EU, the
USA and Middle East (Ataman 1 999). While he modernized Turkey based on EU
provisions, he increased the visibility of Muslimism. One time, he even indicated
that "I am not going the quit

Namaz6

because I am the president" (<;ok ozel

fotograflarla Turgut Ozal 2013). When he was a prime minister, legislation was
passed to liberalize the headscarf in universities in 1988. However, the president

6

Worship that has to be done in five times a day for Sunni denomination of Islam.
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of the period, Kenan Evren vetoed the bill claiming that it was against laicisim
(Turban tart1§malari 60'1arda ba§lam1§t1 2010). As a result, Ozal became the
advocator of the conservative-religious people and he began to pave the way to
today's politics.
After Ozal's death, Islamic-rooted parties was on the rise. From 1993 to
1996, the right-center parties formed the government. In 1996, the

Refah Parli$i

(Welfare Party-RP) lslamist political party came to the fore under the leadership of
Necmettin Erbakan, who is known for his Islamic agenda. Deputies of RP made
statements regarding the importance of Islam and

Sharia.

One of the deputies,

Ibrahim Hali! Celik stated that " I will fight to death to introduce sharia. Therefore,
being a member of RP's is the only way to be a good Muslim because this party is
the Islamic jihad army". Another member of the party, Hasan Huseyin Ceylan said
that "the country is our country; however; the regime is not ours. The regime and
Kemalism is others." (Refah'1 yakan 7'1i 1 998). Because of all these statements
and the party's manner, the National Security Council gave to the party a
memorandum to change their manner on February 28, 1997 (28 $ubat post
modern darbesine giden sOre9 2016). After the memorandum, prime minister
Erbakan resigned without a military coup; nevertheless, this memorandum is called
a post-modern coup in Turkish politics (Milliyet 201 8).
Following the February 28 provisions, the Council of Higher Education
strengthened the dress code in universities. Students who did not take
headscarves off before entering the university buildings were expelled from the
universities. Moreover, the university presidents who did not strictly apply the
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headscarf rules were dismissed (Tahaoglu 2013). Once again Islamic based
lmam-Hatip

secondary schools were closed. In early 1 998, the RP was banned

from the politics. Today's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a member of the
RP. He was even elected as a Mayor of Istanbul between 1 994 to 1 998 from that
party. Also, the former president Abdullah Gui was a deputy leader of the party.
The RP's successor was Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party-FP) won seats at the
parliament. One of its deputies Merve Kavakci, who was wearing the headscarf,
was elected as a parliamentarian; nevertheless, she was not allowed to make an
oath by the prime minister of the period (Kinzer 1999b, 1 999a). The prime minister,
Bulent Ecevit indicated that:
"No one interested in any women's dress style in their private
life; however, here is not a place where anyone can live their
private life. This is the supreme institution of the country.
Anyone who hold an office at the parliament has to obey the
state's laws. This is not a place that can be dared to fight with
the constitution.

Please bring her into the line."(Utan9

goruntoleri 1 999) .
After all, the president Suleyman Demirel also indicated that Merve Kavakci
is a threat to the laic and the powerful Republic of Turkey (Kinzer 1999b). As a
result of the incident, the FP was banned from the politics with the constitutional
court's decision in 2001 (Hurriyet 2001 )

.

By the middle of 2001 a new party, Ada/et ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and
Development Party-AKP) was founded under the leadership of Recep Tayyip
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Erdogan and Abdullah Gui. As a 1 5-month old party, AKP won the next election
with 34.63% of the vote. Because Erdogan recited a poem which has verses with
Islamic essence during his mayorship, he was banned from the politics and
imprisoned for 4 months. Therefore, even though AKP had a higher voting rate,
Erdogan could not be the prime minister at that time. With AKP's outstanding effort
and with the help of the main opposition party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican
People's Party}, the parliament made an amendment in the constitution and
annulled Erdogan's ban from the politics. Thus, in 2003 Turkish parliament held a
by-election in a city which is called Siirt, and Erdogan became a prime minister
winning that by-election (Yavuz 2009). This was the first enthusiastic political tactic
of Erdogan.
Even though the party adopted more secular attitude when it is compared
its predecessors, it was sure that the part desire to lift the ban of headscarf in
universities. Almost all of the party leaders' wives were wearing headscarf. During
the 29th of October Republican Day Reception, the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer
who is extremely secularist did not allow the leaders' scarf-wearing wives entrance
to the presidential palace. Moreover, the commander of the Turkish armed forces
Hilmi Ozkok gave Sezer full support (Yilmaz, Babacan, and Saydamer 2003).
Despite the all of the oppositions, the AKP stayed calm and maintained its
democratic stance.
In 2007, before the general elections, there was a presidential election in
April 27, 2007. The AKP announced that their candidate would be Abdullah Gui
whose wife was wearing a headscarf. Because of that issue, on the same day, the

68

military announced an e-memorandum in their website. The Council of Ministers
gave a response to the military indicating that "the unity and integrity of our country,
the notability of our nation and the qualifications of Turkey as a secular, democratic
and social State of law. Turkey's national unity and integrity and the welfare of the
Turkish Nation is possible with the protection of those values. It is not possible to
approve any behaviors and acts that are revealed from time to time by real and
legal persons against the basic qualifications of our Republic, the Constitution as
well as the laws" (Ural 2012, 731). In the same year, the new president of the state
appointed a new president to the Council of Higher Education. With this change,
wearing a headscarf was liberated virtually.
Since the citizens did not want the military intervention anymore, the ememorandum caused the increased vote rating i n the next elections in July 2007.
The AKP received 47% of the vote. The party took more seats than before in the
parliament. Therefore, Abdullah Gui became a president on 29th August 2007.
However, the E-memorandum7 stayed the military's web site until August 2012
(BugOn 27 Nisan e-muhtirasmm y1I donOmu 2018).
The increase in voter turnout and Abdullah Gui's presidency strengthened
the AKP's position not only in the parliament but also in the eyes of the public.
Thus, the party proposed an amendment to change the headscarf ban in
universities in 2008. The Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (The Nationalist Movement

7

E-memorandum: Turkish General Staff released a statement on the military's website after the

presidential election in 2007. In the statement, the General Staff indicated that elected president whose wife
wears the Islamic headscarf is a threat to the secular system (Turkey's fo11T1er chief ofstaffrejects 'coup
attempt' in e-memorandum testimony - Turkey News 2015)
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Party-MHP), supported the change in the constitution. Hence, the amendment was
a pproved by the parliament. As a result of approval, the tension increased in the
secularist society. They protested saying "Turkey is laic and will stay laic" (Anayasa
Mahkemesi Bal?6rtOsO OOzenlemesini lptal Etti 2008). Relying on the protest,
Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, the Chief Prosecutor applied to the constitutional court
claiming that the amendment was against the constitution's corner stone, laicism.
Even though the constitutional court did not abolish the AKP, the court annulled
the amendment (Anayasa Mahkemesi turban dOzenlemesini iptal etti 2008).
In the same year, 2008, Ergenekon which is known but less spoken
secularist-ultra nationalist organization was being investigated. Even though the
investigation remained until 2013, it played an essential role for AKP's power.
According to the investigation, a group of people who were in the military or had
possible ties with the military organized many terror operations for last 30 years
(Jenkins 201 1 ) . The investigation resulted in the hundreds of military officers
conviction

(0. Butler 2014). It was the beginning of transfer of power from the

military to the AKP, in other words, to Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Consolidating his power, Erdogan offered a referendum to make some
changes in the constitution. The conservative-religious people believe that with this
change they would finally get their freedom of religion. The reform package not
only included liberalization of the headscarf but also rights for the Kurdish people.
Like the headscarf problem, Turkey has had a Kurdish problem since Ataturk's
death. However, the Kurdish problem came to light after 1960s liberalization. The
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libertarian environment made the extreme left wing stronger. The Left wing gave
support to the Kurdish people who could not find a chance to become organized
previously. Moreover, within economic liberalization in 1980s, the Kurdish people
who live in the east part of the Turkey believed they were not being treated equally
with western Turkish people. In the beginning of 1 970s, The Kurdish's Workers
Party (PKK) was founded.
According to the Turkish constitution, all people have equal rights. So, the
Kurdish people have been protected like Turkish under the constitution and they
were given the same rights as any other (TBMM 1 982, I. 1 0) . However, the
organization claimed in their founding statemen that the Kurds do not come from
the same race as the Turks and since the foundation of Republic of Turkey, the
Turkish state has been trying to assimilate and exploit them (PKK nas1I kuruldu ve
gu9lendi? 2013).Relying on these assertions. PKK aimed to establish a new state
in the Turkish Eastern Border including Turkey's southeastern part. Since then, the
Turkish government believe that the PKK is a terrorist group and has to be
destroyed. Moreover, after the 1990s PKK had organized many attacks not only
the Turkish soldiers but also on civilians in the eastern part of Turkey. Therefore,
the Turkish military has been battling with the PKK (Deli 2013; PKK nas1I kuruldu
ve gu9lendi? 2013). The military was in power for the nationalist problem, just like
in the religious headscarf issue.However, with the democratic reform package,
Erdogan provided a different point of view for the Kurdish problem. He asserted
that those battles are not the solutions. the Republic of Turkey have a power to
bring peaceful solution to this issue. Thus, the democratic reform package, which
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was offered by Erdogan would give the recognition of the right to education in one's
mother tongue, open a new TV channel in Kurdish language, and the any changes
in their name of villages would be accepted (Hacaloglu 2013). Those reforms
ensured the Kurdish people vote to reelect Erdogan. The reform package was
accepted by 57.88% of the voters. As a result, the headscarf ban was annulled
and the promises given to the Kurdish people were put in force (Cumhuriyet 2014).

Voting Rates of Erdogan

2002

2007

2010 R

2011

2015 R

2015

FIGURE-6: Voting rates of Erdogan
Source: Author's calculation based on Newspaper official statements for
Venezuela's election, R: Referendum
After the referendum, the general elections were held in 201 1 . Erdogan
received 49.83% of votes. This voti�g rate and his accomplishment gave Erdogan
more power.

So,

after the constitutional changes,

Erdogan abandoned

liberalization. Instead, he gradually focused on monopolizing his power in Turkey.
In the Turkish national elections, the AKP became Turkey's predominant party in
201 1 (Gumuscu 2013).
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While becoming stronger, The Fettullah Gulen's8 Cemaat9 had been a
supporter of Erdogan. Cemaat had a strong influential in conservative parties since
its foundation. Like any other predecessors, AKP were in a communication with
Gulen who lives in the USA Both Gulen and Erdogan come from same cultural
background. "They are both known as pious Muslims who opposed secularism and
army's role in politics" (Gol 2016). Therefore, Gulen's followers supported Erdogan
all the time. Erdogan's higher voting rate mostly came from Gulen's followers. As
the voting rates displayed, Gulen was the strongest person in Turkey until 2013
(Guercio 201 ?b, 55). While Gulen's followers supporting Erdogan, Erdogan was
giving privileges to Gulen's school and its foundations. However, this relationship
came to a dead end. When Erdogan won the 2013 elections, he decided to close
down Gulen's prep-schools for the university entrance exam (Dershaneler resmen
kapat1ld1 haberi 2014). The schools were a huge money resource for the Cemaat.
Thus, the mutual cooperation turned into fierce hatred. This hostility met in the
coup attempt in July 1 5, 2015. Erdogan claimed that Gulen movement was behind
this attempt (Kasapoglu 2016).
The public went out to the streets to protect democracy, or so it seemed. At
first, some citizens thought that they would honestly protect democracy; however,
the majority shouted out "I am going to die for Erdogan" (Ebebi Ehver 2016)
Erdogan gave a direction to the public to protect their country. He mentioned that
if someone dies for their country, they will be "$ehit" (according to Islam, $ehit

8

The political figure in Turkey. He is known as a preacher. He founded the Gulen movement.

9

Also known as the Gulen movement. It is an international Islamic and social movement. It has been

effective in Turkey since

1969.

73

people will go directly to Heaven) (Yeni $afak 2018). He took advantage of the
majority to protect his position. This was the next to last attack to take Turkey
towards authoritarianism.
Although he declared a state of emergency for a period of three months
after the coup attempt, this declaration stayed in force until the last election. With
this declaration, Erdogan ruled Turkey by decree. The government closed down 3
news agencies, 1 6 television stations, 23 radio stations, 45 newspapers, 1 5
magazines and 2 9 publishers. Thousands of people have been arrested as coup
suspects and this has been continuing (The Government's Deepening Assault on
Critical Journalism I HRW 2016). This failed attempt had given Erdogan what he
wanted. He also rewrote the Turkish constitution via referendum in 2017. This is
the last attack up against democracy. The Turkish Parliamentary system has been
changed to the presidential system (Anayasa degi�ikligi ve Ba�kanllk sistemi
maddeleri nelerdir? - 2017). Although the AKP and Erdogan have emphasized that
these amendments will create democratic stabilization in the country, the
amendments show that Erdogan will have all power in his hand. The new
constitution annulled the power of the parliament; hence Erdogan has more room
for his supporters under the roof of the parliament. Moreover, the control power of
jurisdiction over the president was weakened. As a result, checks and balances in
the Turkish system was diminished.
Turkey's economy is still under control. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)'s 2017 data, Turkey is an emerging market (IMF 2017b). As
it is reported by World Bank Statistics and IMF's Statistics, Turkey has the world's
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1 8th largest nominal GDP (IMF 2017a; World Bank 2016). Whereas Venezuela's
inflation rate, after 2013, has been increasing restrain, Turkey's inflation rate is
stable. It can be seen in the Figure-4 (above). As it is seen in the Figure-7, although
both countries have economic fluctuations, Turkey's Real GDP growth has never
experienced a trough since the election of Erdogan, like what Venezuela have
been experiencing since 2016. These statistics demonstrate that there is not a
chance that Turkey is en route of authoritarianism as a result of economic crisis.

Real GDP growth (Annual percent change)
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FIGURE-7: Real GDP growth (Annual percent change)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, Accessed November 25,2018
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

DISCUSSION
Democratization is a challenging process for countries. Even if a powerful
democratic country demands to maintain its democratic position, it has to put in
the effort. However, leaders are not willing to give up their seat.
Chavez, Madura, and Erdogan are representatives of this argument. For
example, whenever Erdogan realized he had more power, he rewrote the Turkish
constitution to change the parliamentary system to the presidential system in 2017
through a referendum. He got all his power depending on people who has sensitive
political issues. He received 51 % of the vote as yes to change the Turkish
Constitution (NlV 2017). Like Erdogan, when Chavez had the power, he also
rewrote the constitution of Venezuela. In 2000, Chavez got all the power and
diminished parliament. Although the military attempted the coup, they failed in
2002. There were so many supporters of Chavez in that time (Canache 2012).
Because of his popularity, he was elected as president getting 58% of the public
vote. He did anything for the public to maintain his popularity. However, his
popularity did not bring wealth to the country, rather Venezuela is a country that
while its citizens starve to death, it has the largest oil reserves in the world.
Because Chavez took advantages of under-represent parts of society, he easily
managed to become an authoritarian leader.
Another main point of the thesis is what the dynamics of authoritarianism in
both countries is. These findings and articles demonstrate that both Venezuela and
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Turkey are on their way to authoritarian regimes. There are many ways to diverge
from democracy. Political and economic policies can count one of them. Whereas
Venezuela took steps to become an authoritarian country by using economic
policies, Turkey's steps were on political policies. When statistics, taken from
reliable institutions and information are taken from articles and newspapers are put
together, they stand behind my hypothesis.
Relying on the results, I would assert this research is valuable for studies of
authoritarianism and democratization. It reveals what kind of dynamics can lead
the countries toward authoritarianism. Therefore, the paper would assist
researchers of democratization and authoritarianism. However, without exception,
all research has limitations in many ways. Not only is this study limited by two
countries data but also is limited by countries' data. There might be the countries
which would have the same problems display different results. Therefore, the
generalizability of the results is scant. In addition, this study is not elaborative of
the quantitative data. Since the indicated countries lack government transparency,
the accessibility of the quantitative data was almost insignificant. Moreover, some
of Venezuela's official government web pages were in only Spanish. It raises
accessibility problems.

Since the research is mostly done with qualitative

methods, I used newspapers and magazines as my main data; however, the media
would not be objective in such countries. While partisan presses glorify
governments, opponents have more negative interpretation than it is.
Since democratization still is a popular issue, my research also has many
implications for future researchers, specifically for the researchers who are
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interested in authoritarianism and democratization. Even though Venezuela's and
Turkey's authoritarianism derive from different reasons, the findings display that
the steps towards authoritarianism are almost exactly the same. Therefore, the
inclusion of the other counties will allow more accurate results. In addition, during
analysis of the findings, the rhetoric of the leaders on indicated policies (economic
and politics) draw attention. In the next research, the hypothesis would be
analyzed in two steps to set a broad sample. In this case, the first step should be
analyzing the effect of the rhetorics on the economy and politics. Afterward, it
should be analyzed whether the policies determined by rhetoric change the country
regime. However, such extensive research requires more time and resources.
In conclusion, although both countries have free elections, their policies do
not support democracy anymore. However, the Venezuelan and Turkish masses
still support democracy. The public of both countries are not the supporters of the
authoritative regime. It is ambiguous how the support of democracy by the public
will affect the countries. The returning back to democracy will not be easy for the
countries, if they persist on their current policies.
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